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FOREWORD 
The methods of warfare are violently changing. Weapons 
and strategic conceptions valid today e.re obsolete tomorrow 
as the entire philosophy of war is undergoing its most rapid 
change in the history of mankind. Science i ,s producing new 
and improved weapons at such a rate that the whole conception 
of war must be constantly adjusted. The next war will be won 
before it is . fought for accurate intelligence, appraisal, 
planning, scientific research and production will determine an 
outcome resting on a few hours activity. It will be a total 
conflict of industry, not men. Any surprise in the future 
approaching the completeness of Pearl Harbor will result in 
overwhelming disaster. The A-Bomb and Hydrogen Bomb bring a 
new suddenness and horror to wa r that causes the whole world 
to wonder where this stampede of technological destruction 
will lead us. 
No one can accurately foresee what the coming years may 
bring, but geograph~cal facts suggest physical limitations to 
the activity of man. Malthus foresaw these limitations as 
they affected man's reproductivity, a little prematurely 
perhaps, but it is none the less sound as a concept today. 
Similar limitations may also exist on man's ability to create 
destruction and survive. Only time will tell. · 
To comprehend the full import of these changes taking 
i 
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place we must know what war is, why it prevails and how it 
has been fought in the past. Strangely enough, war is the 
product or civilization, not barbarism, for civilization has 
built both the incentive to conquer and the means of doing so. 
V'lhile the history of the human race ·has been a record of war, 
it has also been a record of accomplishment as the instinct 
of self-preservation has spurred mankind to far greater in-
ventiveness than would have been the esse had it not been so 
sorely tried. War has been the great catalyst of human devel·· 
opment and, although morally wrong, strong arguements favoring 
war have held some logic irt the past. Today, however, war 
can no longer be a catalyst. It can only be the means of 
destroying civilization. 
War is primarily geographical in character. It is fought 
for areas of the globe containing that which is wanted by men 
from other men. Since control of vital spaces is the dominant 
factor, space reLationships are the primary concepts of war-
fare. This concept has been intensified throughout history 
for, as civilization released increasing numbers of men from 
agriculture to make greater use of the earth's resources, the 
rewards of victory became correspondingly greater. Luxuries 
and higher living standards are the products of men released 
from a mere existence in the soil. 
This geographic concept of WA. r has grown from local pre-
historic battlegrounds to the total global warf'are of' today 
ii 
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e.nd this development is the subject of the reeding to follow. 
PART I 
THE BACKGROUND OF WAR 
CHAPTER I - THE CAUSES OF WAR 
We largely understand the mediums of warfare but, when 
an attempt is made to determine a common cause for the cen-
turies of war that have engulfed mankind, great difficulty 
is encountered. Many have claimed to have found a cause 
common to ell wars. However, determinism is a particularly 
week philosophy in so· complex a study. 
In the beginning, barbarian nomads and hunters struggled 
for hunting grounds and, as anime.ls were domesticated, they 
fought for grazing land. The grass of the Fertile Crescent 
motivated some of history's earliest battles. The isolation 
of the Nile valley permitted the growth of agriculture in 
Egypt and living standards were raised above the existence 
level. Thus, the desire and ability to pay for products from 
other parts of the Mediterranean was created and the enter-
prising Phonecians provided this service. Agricultural land 
and control of trade therefore emerge as two products of 
civilization serving as potent incentives to make war. The 
Homeric Greeks fought Troy for control of the Hellespont and 
the Black Sea trade while the Kings of Crete battled for the 
markets of the Mediterranean. The armies of Alexander looted 
the Middle-East of its gold and treasures as plunder became 
another important motive for war. Rome conquered the Medi-
t erranean area. and organized its food and trade to bring 
luxuries to the people of Rome while making use of two other 
,, 
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spoils of war, slavery and tribute. Under pressure from the 
east, the Germanic tribes introduced still another motive for 
conquest--migration. Due to its overwhelming force, a stag-
nating Rome collapsed and darkness spread over Europe. 
The Feudal system emerged out of the chaos as a means for 
loc•l defense and successfully withstood the ravages of the 
Vikings and the Huns. Warfare in the Feudal period took a 
,s~~ange twist, for the nobles, whether unwittingly or not, 
desired to create a condition of constant warfare in order to 
magnify the need for protection and thus preserve their feuda l 
domains as profitable economic institutions. However, the 
elabora.te code of ethics and rules involved limited the horrors 
of war considerably. While the First Crusade was primarily 
religious in nature, by the time of the Fourth Crusade trade 
and economic motives were clearly discernable. 
Gunpowder brought about the breakup of the Feudal system 
into larger domains and nationalism, the divine right of kings, 
dynastic ambitions, efforts to divert attention from domestic 
strife, local overpopulation, famine, religious fanaticism, 
trade disputes, and all of the more modern differences were 
woven into a complex web of almost endless warfare. Ageless 
rivalries and hates embroiled Europe to such a degree that the 
sound, economic motives for war were overshadowed. With the 
exception of the Spanish lust for gold, not until the French 
Revolution did a new driving force for violence appear. 
2. , 
Famine and poverty drove the French peasant to the bloody 
overthrow of the naticnalistic, but still somewhat feudal, 
monarchy. The enthusiasm of their l i beration gave them 
strength to create a national citizen army and to preserve 
their newly-won freedom against the reactione.ries of Europe. 
This enthusiasm, although eventually used to aid dynastic 
ambitions, carried Napoleon to glory and • erved notice to the 
future of the potential of a citizen army. 
Previously, England had ouietly undergone the Enclosure 
Movement and almost bloodlessly created a free and agressive 
citizenvy of its own. The Enclosure Movement brought more 
eff icient agriculture to England, helped to relieve a recurrent 
famine condition, and established a basis for the urbanization 
that was to follow. Britain's sea power grew and her insular-
ity gave protection from continental wars and strife. Under 
this protection she developed her iron, coal and wool into a 
textile industry. Other industries followed, slowly at first J, 
but with increasing momentum. With the Industrial Revolution 
came great encreases in population and as home food supplies 
became insufficient, Britain found it necessary to exchange 
manufactured goods for food and r aw materials with the empire 
being built oversees. Even at this early date, Marx later 
argued, the basic weakness of the Capitalistic System, under 
which t h e British Empire w~ s beginning its growth, was evident. 
It was his contention that, because productivity steadily 
rose in the home market while the purchasing power of the 
domestic population remained the same, the industri a l surplus 
was forced to find outlets in external markets at 8 rate of 
exchange favorable enough to compensate for t h e la.ck of pur-
chasing 'power at home. The truth of t his is disputable but, 
neverth eless, Grea t Britain us ed its technological a nd mi lit a~y 
superiority to force favorable trade advantages on colonial 
food and raw material areas. Actually, the inhabitants of , 
colonial areas were forced to accept far less for their effort s 
t han what they were worth. 
While England, and to a lesser degree, France and Holland 
were busy consolidating their far-flung empires, the German 
states were still struggling over religious and sectional 
differences. m~en a united Germa ny finally emerged under 
Bismark in 1870, a potentially grea t industrial nation look ed 
around and saw that the early birds had got t en a l l the worms in 
the profitable game of colonial expansion end exploitation. 
As Germany violently strove to make up for lost time, her 
energetic efficiency and scientific genius, her growing navy 
and her plans to tap the wealth of the East via the Berlin-
Baghdad railway threatened England's economic supremacy and 
resulted in counter rneasu:res. With England effectively 
blocking her colonial and industrial development, Germany was 
·drawn into war. 
It begins to be clea r that, since the Industrial Revo-
4. 
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lution, the concept of a standard of living grew in to an 
important cause of war. During the entire history of civil-
ization prior to the Industrial Revolution, any. standard of 
living was based on the capacity of the land to produce plus 
what a few artisans that could be released from agriculture 
might produce. The Industrial Revolution brought both in-
creased agricultural production and more luxuries. Subsequent 
ly, a decreasing number of people were able to produce more 
food for increasing numbers of people engaged in industry. 
Life began to offer so much more to the people of industrious 
and victorious nations that the struggle for world power 
became far more important to a greater number of people than 
ever before. Colonial expansion became more than the whim 
of some power crazed King or minister. It became the will of 
the people, for they all had a fa.r greater stake in it than 
the plunder of old could afford. All the gold of 16th Century 
Spain could not buy one of the industrial luxuries of the 
19th century, because there were none to be had. By 1900 · the 
ordinary citizen of western Europe lived better than the kings 
of old as new luxuries were being invented and produced every 
day. 
Since the Industrial Revolution occurred first in the 
small-area political entities of 1.1\Testern Europe on the basis 
of foreign food supply, the development of industry in other 
parts of the world natural.ly resulted in the disruption of 
5. 
Western Europe's economy. The United States illustrated a 
trend in the 19th century that was to plague England in the 
20th century. The United States was originally a source of 
food and raw materials for England and a market for her 
manufactures. Even when the vast resources of the _agricultural l 
Mid-West were tapped the United States continued to supply 
food to Europe. However, during th:ts development European 
capital, particularly British, came back to build industry 
and transportation in the United States. By 1900 the United 
States was a growing industrial nation and during the First 
World War England was forced to liquidate many of her overseas 
investments to pay for the war. The Second World War saw 
British overseas investment practically wiped out and the 
United States emerge as the great creditor nation of the 
world. The "White man's burden" proved to be not such a 
"burden" after all as the colonial populations became organizea 
I 
and broke up the colonial empires of the world. Now tha.t 
Western Europe can no longer obte.in the exorbitant trade 
advantage that previously existed, she finds her population 
too large and the relative value of her over-developed industry 
too small to procure food end raw materials at a price tha.t 
would enable her to maintain her accustomed standard of living. 
Although the rate of population increase in these industrial 
nations is decreasing, the food problem is still being 
magnified by the attempts of government to maintain and in-
6. 
crease industrial production, for if industria.! production is 
decreased, unit costs rise. This has the long-run effect of 
lowering the ·per capita food supply and is Malthusian Doctrine 
in reverse-- fewer mouths with less to eat! 
Emigration adds to the labor shortage, reduces production 
and makes the immediate situation wor·se, yet unless whole 
industries and their workers are moved to food producing areas, 
the standard of living must be drastically reduced. War is 
an ominous alternative, for a given amount of land can support 
just so many workers in industry at a desired standard of 
living. 
Thus we see the decline of industrial empires based on 
foreign food supply and the rise of two powerful contlnental 
powers with sufficient food, natural resources and climatic 
energy to possibly carry the Industrial Revolution to greater 
heights. However, even these great continental powers, in fact 
the whole world, will be eventually faced with problems arising 
out of overpopulation and the decline of living standards. 
Since a maximum standard of living is possible at a point where 
the proportionately fewest number of people are able to support 
the greatest number of people in efficient and diversified 
industry, a condition approaching maximum extensive, mechanized 
agriculture is a vital factor. Where this condition exists, a 
proper balance between agriculture, industry and population is 
possible. If population increases and industry has reached a 
7. 
near maximum in la.bor efficiency, ·. more and more of the in-
creasing population must be forced into intensive agriculture 
while the land must be used in consideration of its total 
return rather than its economic return. Diminishing returns 
then begin to set in on national agricultural production and 
the standard of living must be lowered. This suggests a 
limit to the ability of industry to expand based on food 
supply. However, even if, through unending scientific advance, 
this limit does not exist, the social prob~em of living 
standards will persist if industry cannot expand fa.st enough. 
This whole conception is in no way absolute, but is rela-
tive, for the balance may be disrupted in numerous ways. Note 
the u. s. s. R. for example: Because of defects in both 
scientific management and in the communistic incentive, 
agricultural production is increasing at a rate far less than 
what is necessary and Russia is forced to extract wheat and 
ot4er foods from her satellite nations. Even more significant 
is the fact that industrial development is being violently 
forced and heavy industry is being built in regions where 
previously no industry of any type existed. This means that 
there is a twofold strain on the balance previously discussed. 
The result is extremely . low living standards·. Only s.ia.ve 
labor, fear, totalitarian discipline or war fanaticism can 
continually drive industry beyond its proper relationship with 
agriculture and cause workers to live in misery for the bene-
8. 
fit of future generations. 
Therefore, a standard of living is the r a tio between the 
number of people in agriculture and the number of people they 
can satisfactorily support in industry. Of course, the l abor 
efficiency of industry ar.d t h e numerical size of the population 
of the unit is important, but it is still essentially the 
amount and variety of wealth a certain number of people can 
create for themselves. 
Many economists, in supporting free trade, argue that the 
larger the self-sufficient unit is, the greater the variety of 
products economically possible. Thus, they insist that a 
larger unit allows greater specialization .and division of 
labor and higher living standards. The ideal of this theory 
envisions the entire globe as one unit, but it fails to 
consider that the standard of living in certain existing 
political units is presently higher t han the standard of 
living in one-world economy might be. In other words, it fails 
to consider the possibility of nearly complete specialization 
and division of labor within one continental area. Division 
of labor only represents economic progress and higher effi-
ciency where positive advan te.ge exists. If a continental 
area such as the United States possesses at least a relative 
advantage in 70 to 80 per cent of the processes involved in 
securing higher living standards, then free trade and regional 
division of labor specialization is not vital enough to warrant 
9. 
any great degree of loss of national self-sufficiency. This 
is particularly true in light of present world conditions. 
The United States at present has a. healthy agriculture-
industry-population balance. Free trade would only disrupt 
that balance and drag its economy down to the level of an 
already overpopulated world. With the resources available to 
the United States and the amount of people to share them, this 
balance can only be preserved by keeping these resources with-
in its boundaries. ~mile free trade offers immediate consumer 
savings, the long range outcome is at least partial reliance 
on foreign production and the increasing ability of over-
populated states to ~et United States resources at more 
favorable rates, not to mention the continued chaos in the 
domestic economy while the process of adjustment was taklng 
place. 
Is the world capable of grasping this standard of living 
concept, or will the peoples of the world continue to be 
forced into war by inefficient leaders and economic systems 
when the real solution to their plight lies, not in the con-
quering of geographical areas but, in more efficient use of 
what they already possess? Regardless of the answer, the 
desire for a higher standard of living remains the most potent 
weapon for leading nations to war in the hands of the power-
mad groups today. 
10. 
CHAPTER II - MILITARY SCIENCE 
From earliest times men have contrived to gain advantage 
over other men in warfare and, while the aua l ity of the fight-
ing men is still important, the weapons and tools of war have 
become increasingly important. out of the dim past came the 
club, the ba ttleaxe, ·sword, spear and other crude weapons 
with metal furnishing the first real advantage. The t aming 
of the horse ga.ve mobility to these weapons and the fundament~· 
ala of tactics began to evolve. The Greeks emphasized gym-
nastic warfare with its stress on human skill, endurance and 
the ability to overlap enemy hordes on the field of battle. 
At Leuctra this became a recognizable tactical plan. ~hillip 
and Alexander organized the first grea.t army of history and 
systematized army organization, logistics, engineering, tactics 
siegecraft and the modern concepts of war. Alexander's was I 
the first standing army and he tra ined in shock and missile 
tactics with cavalry serving as his mobile a.rm. Although he · 
conquered a grea t geographical area, his was a war of tactical 
situations with little strategic consideration, for his con-
quests were made piecemeal. 
The organizing genius of Rome built a Mediterranean em-
pire based on sea power, excellent roe.dways and the resolute 
infantry of the Legion. Fu.rther development of siege craft, 
heavy missile weapons and engineering gave Rome control of the 
strong points necessary to control her empire. -During the 
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long years of the Pax Romana, Rome's fighting ability was 
corrupted and the barbaric vigor of the Germanic •rribes and 
the pressure of migration defeated the a.rmies of Rome at 
Adrianopolis. Although Rome fell, other portions of the em: 
pire turned to the horse in their need for a mobile defense 
against the barbarians. In the Eastern Empire at Constanti-
nople a flexible . defense built around the horse-archer with-
stood all assaults, while in western Europe the heavily 
armored Gothic cavalry defeated the light cavalry of Attila 
the Hun at Chalons. 
The Dark Ages settled over Europe and warfare reverted 
to its crudest beginnings. Although Charles Martel saved 
Europe from the Moors in 7~2, it remained ror Charlemagne to 
revitalize the science of war. Under Charlemagne greater use 
was made of the stirrup, heavy armor and shock tactics, while 
a system of fortified key points serve.d as e. basis for power. 
The rs_ids of t h e Magyars and Vikings increa sed the need for 
well-fortified, self-sufficient localities and mobile cavalry, 
with the result that the feudal system was a natural develop-
ment and the aristocracy of the mailed rider became supreme. 
From 527 to 1065 the Byzantine horse-archer successfully 
defended Constantinople and kept the Saracen out of Europe. 
The strategic position and excellent navy of heavily fortified 
Constantinople gave its defenders a grea t advantage, but its 
military leaders developed strategy to a high degree and 
12. 
organized a highly mobile defense based on a skillful combina--
tion of heavily armed horse-archers with heavy and l ight 
infantry. 
The religious conquests of fanatical Moslems and the con·· 
fused blunderings of the Crusaders contributed little of last-
ing value to military science, although the development of the 
crossbow added to missile potential. 
It wa s for Jenghiz Khan and his Mongol Hordes to set a~ 
example of milita.ry mobility still difficult to comprehend, 
even in our times. He organized a fighting machine that 
swept all before it from the China. Sea to the Plains of 
Hungary. His was basicaliy a plains army of self-sufficient 
light . ce.valry using the sword, bow, and lance and relying on 
complete mobility, encirclement tactics e.nd deception. 
Accurate intelligence, the 11fifth colurnn 11 and terror psycholo--
gy were highly developed despite the huge areas involved. 
Only the rough terra.in a.nd heavy feuda.l fortifications west 
of the Polish and Hungarian Plains kept the Mongols from over~ 
running Europe. 
The code of wa r developed under the Holy Roman Empire 
limited the use of many weapons and war·fare became a defensive 
and pa.ssive pastime. General engagements were rare as the 
aristocracy sought only to preserve their economic way of life. 
However, some feuda~ struggles did go beyond mere questions 
of honor and the logical weapons needing development were the 
13. 
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weapons of siegecraft such as the trebauchet and other heavy 
missile weapons. Curved surfaces and other improvements were 
ad~pted to fortifications and the castle continued in its 
supremity. 
In the field, the armored horseman met his match in the 
longbow at Crecy and Poitiers while the development of gun-
powder began the downfall of the castle. Bombards and hand-
guns were first manufactured in the large towns with the 
result tha t the smaller fortified positions and principalities 
·. , 
were the first to fall in the rush for larger territories. 
The Swiss mercenary infantry using the halberd and crossbow 
to become the most respected warriors of EUrope were made 
obsolete by pike and arquebus tactics supported by l:'l.ght 
artillery. As fire power increased, trench warfare developed 
and military fortifications began to go underground. The use 
of gunpowder was adapted to cavalry tactics by the French 
Huguenots a.nd Cromwell's generals wi.th the horse carbine and 
wheel-lock pistol. 
The Dutch used the geography of the Low Countries to 
free themselves from Spanish rule by flooding an area already 
cut Up by canals, dikes, and estuaries combined with a defense 
of strong points and decisive sea action. 
The Thirty Years War saw the decline of armor with an 
increasing emphasis on greater mobility and discipline. 
Gustavus Adolphus wa.s the first to use paper cartridges as 
1\ 
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standard equipment and instiga.ted notable improvements in 
mobile a.rtillery. His coordinated attack and triumph at the 
Be.ttle of Breitenfeld was a new high in battlefield discipline 
and precision. 
In th~ 1660's Louvois, Louis the - Fourteenth's minister, 
made sweeping changes in the French army and the science of 
warfare in general. The flintlock, with its firing pan pro-
tected from rain, replaced the matchlock and was combined with 
the bayonet to create a new conception of linear tactics. He 
constructed military roads and trained his army with realistic 
war games e.nd maneuvers. Vaube.n' s work in siegecraft further 
heightened the glory of the Sun King's reign. At that time, 
the heavy goods of war moved along canals and rivers with the 
The beginning of the 18th century saw the successes of 
Marlborough, the advent of grenadiers, and the defeat of 
Charles of Sw,eden by Russia presaging the dawn of Russian 
power on the continent. Frederick the Great made the iron 
ram-rod standard eauipment and, because with it his men were 
able to load and fire twice as fast as troops with wooden ram-
rods, enjoyed victories of superior fire-power. He introduced 
horse drawn artillery at battalion level, used the howitzer 
against entrenchments, made first use of the rifle in Europe, 
15. 
. and instigated a form of universal service. 
In America events were taking place that would combine 
with the Industrial Revolution to form the foundations of 
modern warfare. The American rifle fired at will and the 
successes of Indian tactics gave evidence of the inflexibility 
of traditional continental tactics against determined oppo-
sition on rough terrain. A vitally significant step was taken 
when Eli Whitney introduced mass production into warfare by 
manufacturing a standard musket with interchangeable p arts. 
The French Revolution put national power in the hands of 
the citizenry and French tactics were adapted to a large 
citizen a.rmy, nru.ch to the dismay of the professional armies of 
Europe. Mass conscription and French horde tactics resulted 
in a modified verslon of American tactics and Napoleon rode 
the crest of France's newborn national enthusiasm into early 
victories based on mobility, control of his forces and the 
abi l ity to defeat a numerically superior enemy in separate 
battles. The young Napoleon operated from interior lines, 
maintained close personal conta ct over his units, moved 
rapidly and wa s able to concentrate his full strength on 
smaller, divided groups of his slower moving enemy. '~en more 
powerful adversaries demanded a greater force in the field, 
Napoleon was no longer able to personally direct his army and 
16 • 
eventually fell to using mass frontal attack when he lost 
confidence in some of his subordinates. Waterloo was only theL 
last of a series of uncoordinated, piecemeal, mass attacks by 
a general who had lost all sense of his earlier brilliqnt 
mobility. 
of Western 
While Napoleon was . able to defeat the small countrie 
Europe, involving limited geographical areas, that I 
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accepted battle on his own terms, he was unable to solve the 
problem of large geographical areas containing a population 
determined to resist him in any way possible. The great 
spaces of Russia and the impossible terrain of Spain were 
used as weapons by their people wh o refused to commit them-
selves to decisive battle. Semi-guerilla tactics had already 
been witnessed as effective in the American Revolution when 
the British found themselves unable to completely occupy and 
subjugate the colonies while also unable to corner and defee.t 
the sma.ll organized resistance that existed under General 
Washington. 
The percussion cap and the cylindroconoidal bullet 
revolutionized infantry tactics for it rendered the musket 
usable in wet weather and increased its range. The 1830's 
saw the development of the long bullet and Colt's revolving I 
pistol. In 1839 the British army adopted the percussion firing ! 
musket over the flintlock~ . 
The Civil vrar in America was the first truly modern war, 
although the military leaders of Europe gave it little 
at tent i on. For the first time the railroad wa s used in war. 
I 
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Armies were transferred from front to front and concentrations I 
-] 
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were speedily made. The heaviest supplies could be trans-
ported rapidly over large areas with the result that the 
geographical scope . of war was greatly enlarged. Comnru.nication 
within this larger area was made possible by the telegraph. 
Modern weapons first to appear on the scene were the iron-clad 
warship, magazine loading rifle, breech-loading guns, machine 
gun, metallic cartridges, railway guns, wire entanglements a.nd 
the electrically exploded torpedo. The fire-power of infa.ntry 
and rifled artillery became greater than the power to maneuver, j 
causing cavalry to become little more than a harassing element 
ur1less supported by superior fire-power. 
The American Civil War was the first war that was clearly 
decided by industrial power, but military men failed to grasp 
this and the significance of the new defensive fire-power. 
European tactics were still bound up in tradition end not 
completely adapted to the new weapons in use. The Prussian 
breech-loading rifle was decisively victorious over the 
Austrian muzzle-loader at Sadowa in 1866, but the French 
Chassepot of the Franco-Prussian War had a longer range and a 
faster rate of fire than the Prussian gun. However, the 
French disdained the use of trenches as cowardly and the 
Prussia.ns' rifled breech-loading artillery was permitted to 
decide the war. 
Toward the end of the 19th century the small bore maga-
zine .rifle and smokeless powder were standardized while uni-
18. 
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forms of a. protective coloring were used in the Boer War. The 
machine gun was perfected and rapid firing artillery was made 
adaptable to both naval and land warfare by the pneumatic 
recoil device. 
Admiral togo's victory over the Russians in 1904 was 
aided to e. great extent by wireless communication and the 
ensuing war in Manchuria previewed the firepower of World War 
I. The western front in World War 1 witnessed the optimum 
development of a static, linear defense as both sides were 
unable to cope with the entrenched fire-power of the enemy. 
There existed a considerable tactical advantage to an army 
remaining on the defensive for, although fire-power had in-
creased tremendously, tactics had changed little. The defense 
that evolved was a strict linear defense with thin outer lines 
becoming progressively stronger as the enemy penetrated deeper. 
Artillery concentrations only increased cover for the infantry 
in the resulting thousands of craters. 
The holding power created by the Industrial Revolution 
seemed to reach a point in 1Norld War I where fire-power wa s 
to cause a perpetual stalemate in warfare. However, the 
pendulum was to again swing to the offensive as certain symp-
toms of future offensive power were evident, even though the 
outcome of the war was not greatly affected by them. New 
weapons like the tank, gas, and infiltration tactics foretold 
the breaking of linear warfare. 
19. 
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While the Allies won the war, the Germans won enough out 
of the peace to prepare for another and seemed to learn more 
out of the war than did the Allies, for 1939 found the French 
sitting complacently behind a supposedly impregnable linear 
defense in the Maginot Line. Between the wars the Germans had 
I adapted new tactics to modern weapons to render linear defense 
obsolete. 
The German Blitzkrieg was made possible by the internal 
combustion engine, for it was :tts utilization in the airplane, 
tank, and mechanized conveyances for troops,weapons and sup-
plies that gave the panzer unit its lightning-like mobility. 
The ability of a mechanized army to quickly mass a great 
proportion of its power against a point in a linear defense 
enabled it to break through, fan out, encircle and destroy 
the entire l inear defense. Added to this the Germans employed 
their airforce tactically to disrupt local communications and 
isolate the section of the battlefield where they possessed 
overwhelming superiority, thus lessening the enemt's power to 
reinforce the area and increasing the possibility of a clean 
break through. Their mastery of the new aerial warfa re did. 
not, however, ex tend to st~ategic uses anc it was the Allied 
superi ority in strategic air power that let to the downfa l l 
of the Third Reich. 
Thus, centuries of struggle have seen the constant clash 
of offensive and defensive weapons and tactics result in an 
almost complete victory of the tools of destruction over the 
men using them. The horse gave t h e original power of maneuver 
and advantage to the offense, but the development of fortifi-
cations limited this advantage to the open field. The use of 
gunpowder and the musket increased the power of defense at the 
expense of cavalry, and artillery drove fortifications under-
ground. Entrenched infantry and the refinement of artillery 
completely neutra lized mobility based on the horse and it was 
not until the development of mechanized mobility on land and 
in the air that this defensive superiority was broken. 
Will the use of atomic missile weapons result in another 
defensive stalemate due to the 1ncre9sing geographic scope 
of war or is a completely devastating triumph of the offensive 
possible? 
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PART II 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF WAR 
I 
.I 
II 
II 
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CHAPTER I - PAST AND PRESENT 
Heretofore, there had been two mediums of war -- land 
and sea. From early times the mobility afforded by the seas 
was the dominating factor of Europe's wars and it became still 
more important when the nations of Europe colonized the world. 
Prior to the advent of the airplane the geography of world 
power was based on sea power. The role of sea power in ancient 
wars was to control sea communi cations and trade, support sea·-
borne invasions, and to give missile support to operations 
along coastal areas. Although these seem very modern con-
ceptions, power was limited to the oar and the sail and the 
sma.ll ships were at the mercy of the elements. 
The defeat of the Persians and Phonecians by the Greeks 
at Se.lamis saw a small peninsula_r power take command of the 
eastern Mediterranean from the land power of the Persian 
Empire. The Eastern Roman Empire later proved the importance 
' of sea power in dominating the Mediterranean by first using the l 
"fleet in being" as a weapon to maintain power. This proved 
' so effective that she was challenged only twice in six 
centuries. 
In comparatively modern times, Great Bri te.in dominated the 
sea. s. While originally dependant on her insular position and 
seafaring people, the Industria.l Revolution gave her a still 
greater naval advantage in the 19th century. The stea.mship, 
screw propeller, iron construction, rifled ordnance, and 
22. 
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electrical progress led to Engla.nd·' s mighty Dreadnought, yet 
problems were created that were to contribute to her undoing. 
Fuel problems were increased with a corresponding increasing 
dependence on bases. The increased costs and industria.l power 
needed fo'r construction the t gave England a temporary advan-
tage over less developed nations WBs to magnify her woes when 
she no longer held this superiority. The beginning of the 
20th centut>y saw England as a "mistress of the seas" being 
three. tened by the growing naval power of Germany, Japan and 
the United States. 
A new and vital strategic conception growing out of the 
Industrial Revolution was made possible by the incres.sed 
range, efficiency, speed and firepower of navies. This was 
economic ws.rfare. While ineffective forms of economic warfare 
had been known throughout history, it was the incregsed 
strength given navies by industry that made blockade a practi-
cal weapon of war. Economic warfare WR.s a_ttempted in the 
commercial wars of the 17th and 18th centuries, the Continental 
System of Napoleon, and counterblockade by the British, but it 
was not until World War I that real economic we.rfare became 
eff ective. 
The purpose of economic warfare is to deprive the enemy 
of his economic resources. This means fuels, metals, food, 
textiles, leather, rubber, and other raw materials. Naval 
blockade wa s the first eff ective means of accomplishing this, 
but other methods have developed. Shipments destined to make 
an attempt in running the blocka de were tracked down and 
stopped before t h ey were even loaded aboard a vessel. This 
practice extended . to f a r-flung area s of' the earth and the 
geography of economic warfare proved to be limitless. Other 
mean s were embargoes, boycotts, freezing -of cr edits, diversion 
of enemy tra de with neutrals, competition for neutral trade, 
the "navicert system", black lists, rationing of neutral trade 
and, above all, the total concept of contraband. 
In World Wa.r II the airplane greatly aided the navies in 
maintaining the blockade by patrolling the oceans, operating 
aga.inst submarines, bombing harbors, and disrupting vi tal 
transporta tion lines. In World Wa.r II the use of diplomatic, 
economic, and financial power and military, naval and aerial 
activity reached a peak of coordination in stopping the flow 
of stra tegic materials to the Axis Powers. 
The geographic position of Germany wa s such tha t she wa s 
l a cking in oil, iron ore, manganese, chromium, tungsten, 
molybdenum, vanadilmiil, nickel, mica, industri a l diamonds, 
rubber, textile raw materials, fertilizers, oils and fats, 
lea.ther, sulphur, pyrites, and many other rna terials. Although 
she stockpiled many of these before the wa r, she hoped to con-
tinue overseas procurement t hrough the neutral nations of 
Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, a nd Turkey. The huge geographical 
area to be blockaded led the Allies to a policy of blockade 
on-the-highseas ratbe~ tban a 
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close blockade of the many ports available to the Germans at 
the height of their conauests. 
In the long run the financial superiority of the pound 
sterling and the dollar enabled the Allies to outbid the 
Germans for strategic materials all over the globe. The Allies 
were able to offer goods in payment while German exports were 
drastically confined. 
With the rise of air power a third dimension has been 
added to warfare that threatens unlimited offensive possibil-
ities. In the First World War, air power was used primarily 
for observation, although Mitchell was able to supply some 
tactical support to Americ~n ground forces near the end of 
the war. In the Second World ,!.fa r, the air truly beca_me the 
third medium and dimension of warfare. It became both a 
tactical and strategic weapon a_nd its development began the 
downfall of the superiority of sea power. In the Spanish 
Civil ·war a Franco battleship was sunk by a Loyalist airplane 
and from that time on the ba ttleship lost importance. During 
World War II the battleship was used to protect a new ca.pital 
ship made necessary by the limited range of aircraft--the 
carrier. Naval strategy today is built around the carrier and 
it will continue to be important to military operations until 
sufficient range and accuracy are developed in aeria_l weapons. 
' The sea will continue as a vital medium of warfare until the 
air is able to assume all of its present functions, the most 
im _QJ>tant bei:rrg__the economical trans orta tion of heavy cargoes. 
-~ ____ ... ___ _ 
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The rise of air power over sea power has disrupted the 
previously existing geographic conceptions of world power 
and the strategy of mobility in general. The power of the 
industria l , marl time nations of Europe depended upon their 
lines of trade to their overseas empires. England dominated 
the scene with her systematic control of the points strategic 
to sea co~~unication. Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Aden, Capetown, 
and Singapore were but a few of the bases involved in her 
"lifeline". Combined with these wa s the "fleet in being" 
concept of Mahan. Today, all the strategic points and narrow 
seas are vulnerable to a ir attack and the "fleet in being" 
idea is doomed, for, while naval weapons a re serviceable for 
long periods of time, obsolescence is high in the air. A 
sunken fleet is usually a decisive and lasting defeat, but 
lost aircraft can be ouickly replaced. 
The r a iding submarine has twice before unsuc cessfully 
challenged Mahan's superiority of the "fleet in .being", but 
the u. S. s. R., not heeding these lessons, seems to be pre-
paring for a thi rd attempt. Air superiority is the a.lready 
proven solution to the problem. 
Air power as an offensive weapon had its first rea l test 
in the Spanish Civil War, although some minor successes in 
World Wa r I had gone largely unnoticed by the world's military 
leade r s. Germany, in her early conquests, proved the tactical 
wor.th of air power in isolating the battlefield and disrupting 
communications, but she failed to 
----------- ---
the otential 
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of airpower. Germany began the war with a superiority in air 
power and conauered industrial regions that should have 
' ' 
enabled her to maintain that superiority, yet, in the Battle 
of Britain in 1940, she was defeated by a numerically inferior 
force because her air arm was better suited to tactical support 
than strategic bombing. It remained for the Allies to develop 
systematic strategic bombing a.nd the means for carrying it out. 
The primary objectives of long range strategic bombing 
were the transportation system, sources of power, vital 
industries and food. Since German industry was relatively 
dispersed, transportation became the primary target, but in 
Japan, where over half the nation's production was concentrated 
in the domestic system of less than ten cities, the incendiary 
bombing or the large cities W9S or first importance. Much of 
Japan's transportation was by sea which also gave port facil-
ities high priority. 
Out of these facts came the basic ideas of strategic 
bombing. Traditional concentrated attack on land and sea 
previously meant geographic concentration o~ spacial conver-
gence, while concentrated attack in the air may be a geograph-
ically dispersed attack. It became evident that the continued 
bombing and complete destruction of a single industry might 
destroy one entire step in the enemy's system of production. 
Since this step would be located in many widely sepe.rated 
ractory localities, a concentrated aerial attack necessitated 
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operations actually dispersed geographically. Fundamentally, 
however, concentration in the air is not a spacial conception, 
but one of time. On land, concentration is superior fire 
power at .a we~k point, but in the air it is the largest 
bombing force above the target for the shortest time. 
It is proven that it was better to destroy one target 
permanently than to damage several · and that completely de- ·· 
stroying the output of an auxiliary industry was more effec-
tive than only damaging a basic industry. Industrial bottle-
necks and units difficult to replace, such as certain precision 
instruments and machine tools, offered excellent targets. 
Advanced weapons production that threatened our tactical 
superiority, such as V weapons and jet planes, were also vital 
targets. 
In Europe, the systematic destruction of transportation 
was of greatest importance due to the function of Germany's 
transportation system in her economy. Because the distribution 
of coal, oil, iron, and chemicals was so dependent on the 
transportation system, Germany's economy suffered when it was 
effectively disrupted. In late 1944 the Allied air forces 
were able to practically isolate Germany's coal producing 
centers. Together with the attack on oil movements, Germany's 
industrial production was slowed down considerably. A trans-
portation system is a pa.rticularly good target if statistics 
prove its vital relationship to the enemy's economy, for it is 
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so dispersed th~t surprise ~ttack is easy and it c~nnot be 
camouflaged very successfully. Railro~ds ~nd bridges offer 
opportunities for mor~ effective destruction than do motor 
roads ~nd water transport. "Cut-bombing" of open railroad 
track was found effective if there were but few alternate 
lines, but junction bombing ~ccomplished more where numerous 
alternate lines existed. Some success resulted from the 
aerial mining of rivers ~nd ca.nals and the bombardment of 
c~nal locks ~nd loading facilities. More far-re~ching were 
the prolonged attacks on locomotives, rolling stock, round-
houses and repair shops. ~bile the foregoing methods are 
geographically dispersed attacks on transportation, the most 
conclusive and effective attack was a true geographically 
concentrated attack. This w~s the "interdiction line~ concept 
by which all forms of transportation within a selected area 
abreast a strategic line · of communication were subjected to . 
an all-out attack. The aim was to stop all transportation 
completely. Thus, locomotives and motor transports were 
trapped in a maze of disruptions and were easier to destroy. 
If three bridges in a row were destroyed the middle bridge 
could not be repaired until one of the others was first re-
paired and the cumulative effect of hundreds of breaks was 
devastating. 
The changes in the geography and tactics of war have been 
great, but an entirely new over -all concept has a.lso appeared 
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in relatively recent times. It has been called geopolitics. 
Various other names have · been applied to it, but it is 
essentially the geography of world power. This geography of 
world power, for a century prior to World War I, had been 
based on industrial might and sea power. However, the develop-
ment of air power, the economic development of continental 
areas, and the political awakening of colonial populations 
have changed all this. Industrial concentrations in small 
areas have proven vulnerable to air attack and the loss of 
colonial food sources have made t he position of the small 
area industrial nations of Europe almost untenable. 
The geography of future world power and military might 
seems to be based on control of a great deal of space, not 
control of strategic pinpoints. Within this space must be the 
agricultural and natural resources necessary to maintain the 
area as a single economic and military unit and to afford 
certain strategic protection to be mentioned later. 
No strategic point or combination of points will ever 
again be able to withstand an all-out attack by a fully-
developed continental power. This increasing domination of 
area over concentration is due to the widening distribution 
of the resources necessary to modern warfare and the triumph 
of offensive over the defense. The ever increasing populations 
and economic and industrial interdependence has created a 
condition where total defense is virtually impossible. While 
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geographic dispersement has contributed to this situation, the 
only defense is greater dispersement. It must be realized 
that we are approaching the de_y when the destruction of large 
areas of standing crops will be feasible, as will be large 
areas of production concentration. This means that all types 
of production must be broken down and scattered over an entire 
continent to give maximum defense. The enemy must never be 
given the opportunity to combine e_ strategically concentrated 
attack with a geographically concentrated attack. 
Considering the increasing r ange and destruction of 
weapons, the necessity to raise and store surplus food, and the 
raw materials and minerals needed by a nation in order to wage 
war, it becomes obvious that only the powers of continental 
proportions ca n possess any measure of defense aga.inst attack 
in the future. At any rate, the future is much more complex 
than the geopolitica l conceptions of Carl Haushofer would have 
it, for thousands of geographical, social, and economic factors 
are all working to produce a world that no man can foresee. 
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CHAPTER II - THE FUTURE 
The future of warfare is becoming clearer, but the actual 
manner in which the next was will be fought is still in doubt. 
Eventually, the technological extremes of warfare will be 
- limited or the human race will be partially or wholly wiped 
out. These limitations will come about by common agreement or 
after one great power has destroyed all opposition. Another 
possibility is that the powers capable of waging war will so 
devastate each other that the impetus of civilization will fall 
to the now backward areas of the globe. 
In the meantime, however, the weapons of war and the 
geographic scope of their use are changing daily. Weapons and 
tactics never used become obsolete before they are even tested. 
The sha.pe of the next war depends largely on when it is fought, 
for any day in this powderkeg of a world may find the powers 
forced to grapple with what they have available, not what they 
have on the drawing boards. 
The advantage in any future war lies squarely with the 
u. s. s. R. The United States must wait like a "sitting duck" 
until the u. s. s. R. picks the most advantageous time for 
war. Public opinion in the United States would never permit 
an attack on the u. s. s. R. but the Soviet can attack at any 
time, for its leaders have an absolute power over the people. 
The nature of modern war a.nd the swiftness and surprise with 
which an attack can be made gives a deadly advantage to such 
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an agressor. However, the question is, can this advantage be 
made great enough to warrant an attack by the u. S. s. R.? 
War has always been waged because one nation thought that it 
could win more than it would lose. This decision is becoming 
increasingly difficult to make, because all of the enemy's 
means of fighting back must be destroyed in order to win any-
thing. Henceforth, the destruction of armies will not be the 
primary aim, but the destruction of the means of waging atomic 
warfare. It is no longer a case where mere superiority is 
sufficient, but one where complete obliteration of the enemy 
is necessa.ry, for the A-bomb and H-bomb will make it possible 
for a small force to deliver deadly blows and create a stale-
ma.te. Since tota l victory is becoming progressively less 
likely there is a growing feeling that total war will be un-
likely unless preceded by a successful attack from within. 
Neither nation could hope to escape tremendous destruction in 
the case of an all-out war with the result that a struggle of 
ideology and infiltration will prevail. 
The entire future of warfare may hinge on the economy of 
the various operations possible, for no matter what economic 
system goes to war, the economic costs a.re felt by the people 
and the system in general. In this light, total destruction 
may be more economical than victory with its subsequent 
occupation, because the costs of occupying a continental nation 
would be more than any economy could pear. As long as any 
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people of a conquered nation survive, even the systematic 
destruction of all industry could not eliminate the possibility 
that the means for eventue.l counter measures were not hidden 
away. The complete domination of countries such as occurred 
in the small nations of Western Europe is no longer possible, 
for the expenses involved would be greater than the benefits 
received. 
If, then, complete destruction becomes the only safe aim 
of war, what could possibly be the mqtive for such an under-
taking? Wars in the past have usually been fought to gain 
something, not to destroy it. However, the desire to gain 
security from attack and the opportunity to subjugate the rest 
of the world without opposition would be two good motives for 
the U. s. s. R. to destroy the United States. 
Since the establishment of an advantage grea t enough to 
'· 
warrant risking war is doubtful at present, competition between 
Capitalism and Communism for the economic development of the 
world might become a form of wa rfare in itself. The system 
that proves itself most effective will win the support of 
greater areas, extend its sphere of influence and eventually 
increase its war potential to a point where the enemy would 
lose t h e support of its own people. 
Even in this new warfare of economic development the 
U. s. s. R. would seem to possess a considerable advantage, 
for it can assign funds to an undeveloped area strictly for 
military and political gain and with complete disregard for 
the economics involved. The United States is somewhat limited 
to the development of areas where private enterprise can 
profit, because the use for such purposes of funds obtained 
by taxation is more difficult under a democratic form of 
government. In regions where the use of land, resources and 
labor cannot be greatly expanded, the remaining factor of 
I 
production must be expanded to increase the a.rea' s productivity 
That factor is capital. Under Capitalism the area under 
consideration is not likely, without outside capital, to 
produce a surplus whereby this needed capital ca.n be created. 
However, under the Soviet system this capital can be at lea.st 
partially created by the region itself at the expense of 
living standards. 
There is some consolation for Capitalism in all this, 
though. Where the standard of living is already low, the 
u. s. s. R. has no particular advantage, because the people 
of these areas can make economic progress under Capitalism 
without losing their freedom to the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat". However, the Soviet method is much more rapid 
and dramatic e.nd may appeal to the leaders of groups and 
population elements who would tend to gain favors under 
Communism. Thus, it would seem that the United States, in the 
development of backward areas, must create incentive for the 
individual in order to succeed, for the personal aspirations 
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of · millions of people can produce far more than fear. We 
must believe this because, after all, individual opportunity :ts 
e · the basis of Ce.pi telism and our whole way of lif.e. Another 
thing in Capitalism's favor is that it is in e. much better 
economic and industrial position than is the U. S. s. R. 
The Soviets have applied selective economic geography 
and long range economic pla.nning on a scale never witnessed 
before. They have the power to completely subjugate immediate 
human welfare to the aims of the state. The basis of the 
entire struggle between the two systems might best be e.pproe.che · 
by Capitalism in the auestion of the relative importance of 
rapid industrial progress and living standards. 
The problem facing the Capitalist nations is one of huge 
geographical dilm.ensions. They must develop South America and 
Africa while maintaining their position in Europe, create a 
middle class where none exists end raise the standard of living 
throughout. At the present time the development of the great 
land and natural resources of South America and Africa seem 
more important than assuming the liability connected with the 
over-populated areas of Asia. However, despite the advance oj~ 
Communism into Asia, the development of its resources is almost 
completely dependent on the Capitalist world. The United 
StRtes and Great Britain can trade with China and South-East 
Asia far more economically than ca.n th~ U. s. s. R. overland 
and they are also in a better economic position to offer the 
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tools of development than Russia is. With a real plan of 
action and a coordinated foreign policy the capitalist coun-
tries could decisively win in this new warfare, although there 
are some who predict that the economic development of the 
Orient will spell the doom of Western Civilization. 
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It must be realized that even the winning of this struggle 
might provoke total war. Many wars have been started by desper 
ate rulers when their regime was faced with failure. Therefore ! 
the United States must take steps to increa se both her ability 
to absorb atomic punishment and her power to counter-attack 
against a war of desperation. This means an attempt to geograp -
ically disperse vulnerable industrial and population concentr~L-
tions or taking steps to provide protection for existing con-
centrations. A combination of both will probably prevail. 
The geographic dispersal of industry is not an easy task, 
particularly in a nation where free enterprise and individual 
liberty is so important. Cities develop because of vital 
geographic and economic reasons and their function in the 
nation's economy is established with their growth. To move 
the industries of a city would destroy the economic function 
that it provides and disrupt the economic geography of the 
entire hinterland. Capital investment and real estate values 
would be all but wiped out and any idea of the government 
assuming such losses would be preposterous, for the expense 
would be prohibitive. The United States government is already 
moving many industries and is encountering difficulties. The 
most noticeable of these to date is the problem of losing 
the pools of technically skilled workers existing in urban 
areas, for workers with homes and families cannot easily leave 
their homes to follow a moving industry. This has been par-
ticularly evident in the government's program of moving the 
aircraft industry out of coastal areas to remote inland posi-
ti ons. 
The difficulties involved in dispersing our cities would 
seem to render such an operation in~ossible for quite some 
time. However, certain strategic industries and new industries 
could be located more advantageously by cooperation between 
government and industry without disturbing the existing eco-
nomic structure of the city. This would lead to a more gradual 
and more economical lessening of city concentrations. There 
is also much that could be done within the city itself. The 
spacial density of the population within the city could be 
lessened and its vulnerability to atomic attack decreased by 
spreading out and geographically rearranging its essential. 
services. Power, water, and communications could be relocated 
so that their function in the city could not be .completely 
destroyed by one well-aimed bomb. Together with improved con-
struction and underground garages that could be converted into 
bomb shelters, this inter-city dispersal might make the use 
of an H-bomb uneconomical to the enemy. The high cost of the 
_., 
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bombs wilL limit their use to targets where maxinium damage 
can be inflicted. 
Of course the H-bomb is still a doubtful possibility, 
but if one gallon of tritium could be exploded, the explosion 
would be fifty times more powerful than the Nagasaki atomic 
bomb. If it were exploded three miles above the target, max-
imum destruction could be expected. The heat from the explo-
sion would be tremendous and people in the open ten miles away 
would be critically burned. The heat a.nd force of the blest 
would almost completely destroy buildings within a hundred 
sauare mile area a.nd the radioactivity would prove fatal to 
humans within a fifty square mile area. Considering the huge 
expense entailed in the manufacture of the bomb, there are 
only a few economic targets available in the world. These are 
the great cities a.nd a few strategic areas such as the Panama 
Canal. Using five H-bombs, the u. s. s. R. could attack New 
York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit and Washington and reach 
over 20,000,000 people. A different situation exists in Ru~sia 
for only Moscow and Leningrad are presently large enough to 
warrant H-bomb attack. The job of the United St i'J. tes, then, is 
to disperse the area of its cities without destroying their 
economic function and to take steps to insure the survival of 
the federal government under a guided missile attack. Dupli-
cate capi ta.ls and legislation aboard trains have already been 
considered. Another suggestion has been the use of television 
39. 
==========t=====-=-=============================================================-~========= 
=-==------· ·=--==!!====--~==---= .. 
from widely scatter~d points in government activities. It 
seems likely that such a vi tal opera.tion could be more eco-
nomieally protected by underground construction. 
In considering the material aspects of a war in the 
immediate future, certain facts stand out. The Russians will 
never plan the risk of a military move against a small nation 
-
that would justify an attack by the United States, nor will 
they embark on a large-scale progr~:~.m of military conquest until I 
the United States has been completely neutralized. Some mili-
tary experts have gone to great lengths evaluating relative 
strengths and plotting probable Soviet moves in the Eastern 
Hemisphere. They point out that the u. s. s. R. could drive 
to the Rhine, overrun Europe, gain control of the Skaggerak 
for their submarines, occupy Norway and Spitsbergen, capture 
the Middle-Eastern oilfields from the air, take control of 
the Dardanelles and Suez, invade Alaska, atomize U. s. ports 
and destroy the Panama Canal all within a very short time. 
All this might be true, but if the Soviet once lost the 
offensive, the initiative would pass to the United States e.nd 
the outcome of the war would only be a matter of time, con-
siderable time perhaps. The availability of Africa as 8 base 
for a U. S. move into the Eastern Hemisphere might prove a 
very vital factor. At any rate, the Soviet Union could never 
hope to utilize the resources of all that conouered territory 
in time to aid them in the struggle against the United States 
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and they would be a liability to hold rather than an asset. 
If the U. S• s. R. ever risks war, it will come as a.n all-out 
surprise attack against the United States. 
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CONCLUSION 
The geography of war has already changed to the extent 
that one nation can no longer conquer other regions of the 
world merely because itholds a superiority over its major 
adversary. Future wars will find the major powers engaged in 
a devastating struggle, with the onlooking lesser powers likely 
to inherit the earth --- or what is left of it. 
While great stress has been placed on the development of 
aircraft and guided missiles, the other mediums of war cannot 
be neglected. Military theorists have led the world to be-
lieve that the future of war lies entirely in the air. This 
is not so. Air superiority will be the means of establishing 
the initial advantage by which a war may be won, but it will 
remain for land operations and troops to complete the conouest, 
occupation and complete subjugation of the enemy if war comes 
in our time. The only economical means of carrying out these 
land opera.tions is by sea transportation. We must continue 
to rely on ships to transport the troops and heavy equipment 
of war for some time to come, for invasion and support complete 
ly by air is far from being possible at this time, particularly 
on a scale large enough to defeat Russia. Navies will be 
highly vulnerable in the early stages of the struggle for air 
supremacy and they must be scattered to avoid destruction. 
However, once an advantage has been established, the relative 
development and strength of navies will again be important. 
=--=-='----=---=--=-= !I= ------· ----
r=--
OUt of all these changes in warfare, one factor stands 
out. It must be recognized that the desire of the hume.n being 
to better the position of himself and his family is the 
greatest driving force in the world. Call it human greed if 
you like, but the economic system that most effectively 
succeeds in harnessing this force for the building of a better 
world will probably triumph in the coming struggle of economic 
geography. 
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ABSTRACT 
The methods of warfare are violently changing as science 
produces new and improved weapons at such a rate the.t the 
whole conception of war must be constantly adjusted. While 
no one can accurately predict what the future may bring, 
geographical facts suggest physical limitations to the activ-
ities of man. Malthus foresaw these limitations as they 
effect man's reproductivity. Similar limitations may e.lso 
exist to man's ability to create destructions and survive. 
The past has seen various economic, racial and religious 
differences causing we.rs, but the Industrial Revolution gave 
to the masses the basis fo.r a new and higher standard of 
living. This enabled the population of the world to double 
and provided a common aim to war, for national power and contro 
of raw materials and food meant more to individual well-being 
than ever before. 
The first half of the 20th century saw the decline of 
industrial and commercial empires based on foreign food supply 
• and the rise of the continental powers and former colonial 
areas. Certain new fundamentals of national power have arisen 
that doom the small-area political entities. Since the maxi-
mum standard of living is possible at a point where the pro-
portionately fewest number of people are able to support the 
greatest number of people in efficient and diversified industry 
a condition approaching maximum extensive and mechanized 
agriculture is a vital factor, When this condition exists, 
a proper balance between agriculture, industry and populati a1 
is possible. If population increases and industry 
a near maximum in labor efficiency, more and more 
has reached 
1 of the in-
. I 
creasing population must be forced into intensive agriculture 
or unemployment and the land must be used in consideration of 
its total return rather than its economic return. Diminishing 
returns then begin to set in on national agricultural produc-
tion and the standard of living must be lowered. Even if, 
through unending scientific advance, no limit to the ability 
of industry to expand exists, the problem of declining living 
standards will persist if industry cannot expand fast enough. 
This whole conception is in no way absolute, but is rele.tive, 
for the balance may be disrupted in many ways. The United 
States at present has a healthy agriculture-industry-populatic~ 
balance. In light of present world conditions free trade 
would be economically and militarily unsound. It would only 
disrupt ths.t balance and drag our economy down to the level 
of an already overpopulated world. With the resources avail-
able to the United States and the amount of people to share 
them, this balance can only be preserved by keeping these 
resources within its boundaries. While free trade offers 
immediate consumer savings, the long range outcome would be 
at least partial reliance on foreign production and the in-
~=-=-==-=-==9====-=~=--=~========--=-=-===-===~=-=-~~~=-======================== 
creasing ability of overpopulated states to get u. s. resource 
at more favorable rates, not to mention continued chaos in the 
, domestic economy while the adjustments were taking place. 
Centuries of struggle have seen the constant clash of 
offensive and defensive weapons result in the almost complete 
victory of the tools of destruction over the men using them. 
The horse gave the original power of maneuver and advantage 
to the offense, but the development of fortifications limited 
this advantage to the open field. The use of gunpowder and 
the musket increased the power of defense at the expense of 
cave.lry, and artillery drove fortifications underground. 
Entrenched infantry and the refinement of artillery completely 
neutralized mobility based on the horse and it was not until 
the development of mechanized mobility on land and in the air 
that this defensive superiority was broken. The rise of air 
power doomed the naval conception of defense of strategic 
points and changed the conventional idea of concentrated 
attack. This third dimension of warfare enabled a strategi-
cally concentrated attack to become a geographically dispersed 
attack on scattered units of the same industry or target, thus 
differing from traditional concentrations on land end sea. 
The geography of future world power and military might 
seems to be based on control of a great deal of space, not 
control of strategic points. Within this space must be the 
a.gricultural and natural resources necessary to maintain the 
area as a single economic and military unit. No strategic 
point or combination of points will ever again be able to 
withstand an all-out attack by a fully developed continental 
power. This increasl.ng domination of area over concentration 
is due to the widening distribution of the resources necessary 
•. 
to modern warfare and the triumph of offensive over the defen-
sive. The ever increasing populations and economic 9.nd indus-
trial interdependence has created a condition where total de-
fense is virtually impossible. While geographic dispersement 
has contributed to this situation, the only defense is greater 
dispersement. Considering the increasing range and destruction 
of weapons, the necessity to raise and store surplus food, and 
the raw materials and minerals needed by a nation in waging 
war, it becomes obvious that only the powers of continental 
proportions can possess any measure of defense against attack 
in the future. The future is much more complex than the 
geopolitical conceptions of Ha.ushofer would have it, for thou-
sands of geographical, social, and economic factors are working 
to produce a world tha.tno man can foresee. 
The geography of war has already changed to the extent 
that one nation can no longer conouer other regions of the 
earth merely because it holds a. superiority over its major 
adversary. Future wars will find the major powers engaged in 
I 
a dev.astating struggle, w1 th the onlooking lesser powers likely 1 
to inherit the earth - or what is left of it. ll 
II 
While great stress has been placed on the development of 
aircraft end guided missiles, the other mediums of war connot 
be neglected. Air superiority will be only the means of 
establishing the initial advantage by which a war may be won, 
but it will remain for land operations and troops to complete 
the conauest, occupation and subjugation of the enemy if war 
comes in our time. The only economical means of carrying out 
these land operat1ons is by sea transportation. We must con-
tinue to rely on ships to transport the bulk of troops and 
heavy eauipment for some time to come, for invasion of a con-
tinent and support completely by air is far from being possible 
at this time. 
Another twist taken by global warfare in recent years is 
the race of the two most powerful nations to develop the other 
nations of the world and bring them into their own military 
fold. One factor stands out in this; it must be recognized 
that the desire of the human being to better himself is the 
greatest driving force in the world. Call it human greed if 
you. like, but the economic system that most effectively suc-
ceeds in harnessing this force for the building of a better 
world will probably triumph in the coming struggle of economic~ 
geography. 
